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INTRODUCTION
A business’s trademark protects its intellectual property, forms
its foundation, and allows it to garner goodwill in its products or
services; protecting its property rights in its trademark, therefore, is
integral to the success of a business. The First Amendment freedom of
speech is also integral to the lifestyle of American individuals and
businesses alike. To what extent can an individual or business exercise
its First Amendment freedom of expression without infringing upon
the trademark of another?
The Seventh Circuit addressed this question in a case where
fiction and reality collide. In Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner
Bros. Entertainment, the owner of computer software that removes
private data from public computers filed suit against Warner Bros. for
unauthorized use of its trademark, “Clean Slate,” in the film The Dark
Knight Rises and websites advertising the film. In the film, “the clean
slate” describes a hacking program that enables Catwoman to rid
databases of all evidence of her criminal past. Plaintiff alleged unfair
competition under Indiana law and trademark infringement and unfair
 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Thank you, all the
wonderful Viranis in my life, for your endless love and support.
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competition under the Lanham Act, claiming that consumers were
incorrectly led to believe that Fortres Grand’s software was related to
the fictional program from the film.
This note discusses the following matters: (1) the Lanham Act
and its standard for a finding of trademark infringement; (2) the
doctrine of “reverse confusion”; (3) the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of
the reverse confusion doctrine in its 2014 ruling in the Fortres Grand
case; (4) the extent of the First Amendment’s protection of creative
expression when it implicates the trademark of another; and (5) the
effect of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on future trademark lawsuits
based on reverse confusion.
BACKGROUND
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051 et seq, (the “Act”)
codifies federal trademark law, providing for trademark registration
and regulating the use of trademarks in commercial activity. Section
45 of the Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others.” 1 Further, a trademark must be used in commerce. 2 Because
the Act provides such a broad definition, trademarks “can consist of
almost any conceivable subject matter, from a word, symbol, picture,
design, numeral, escutcheon, monogram, abbreviation, acronym,
slogan, personal name, phrase, newspaper or magazine column title,
title of a book series, [or] fragrance,” 3 among other representations.

1

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
Id.
3
ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §
1.02 (2014). See also Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding
that color in itself may be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act).
2
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A trademark serves “to point distinctively, either by its own
meaning or by association, to the origin or ownership of the wares to
which it is applied.” 4 Trademark law is based on the notion that
consumers are entitled to identify the source of a product. 5 The Act
provides “national protection of trademarks,” which the United States
Supreme Court has noted “is desirable . . . because trademarks foster
competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the
producer the benefits of good reputation." 6 Trademarks not only
identify the source of goods, but also represent and generate goodwill
for the producer. 7 The consistent production of high quality products
that can easily be identified as originating from a particular producer
creates a good reputation and goodwill for that producer that foster
brand loyalty and generate sales.
B. The Lanham Act Standard of Likelihood of Causing
Confusion
Section 32 of the Act provides civil liability for “any person
who shall . . . use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.” 8 In § 43, the Act further provides civil
liability for “any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
4

Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543
(1920).
5
See generally Tanqueray Gordon & Co. v. Gordon, 10 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.J.
1935).
6
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); see
also San Francisco Arts & Ath. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531
(1987).
7
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2120 (2004).
8
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a) (2005).
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or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person.” 9 These provisions of the
Act serve a dual purpose: (1) to prevent the use of identical marks
causing confusion to consumers about the actual source of goods and
services; and (2) to protect the goodwill that companies have acquired
in their trademarks.10
Preventing confusion as to the source of a good is intimately
connected to protecting the goodwill of the trademark owner. The
company owning the registered trademark is the senior user of that
mark, while the company using an identical, unregistered mark is the
junior user. If two competing goods use confusingly similar marks,
consumers may misidentify the source of the goods; if consumers
confuse the product of junior user Company A as produced by senior
user Company B, Company B then loses control over consumer
perception of its reputation. 11 Company A has infringed upon the
trademark of Company B if its use of the similar mark is likely to
mislead consumers. 12
Because actual confusion often cannot be proven, the essential
test for trademark infringement is proof of the likelihood of confusion
as to the source of the product at issue.13 This central question is based
on whether consumers “are likely to believe that defendants’ products
or services come from the same source as plaintiffs’ protected
products or services.” 14 Courts make this determination on a case-by-

9

15 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under
Lanham Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, § 2[a] (2003).
11
GILSON, supra note 3, § 1.03.
12
Id. at § 5.01.
13
Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a].
14
ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, 5-5 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §
5.01 (2014).
10
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case basis, using various factors in evaluating the likelihood of
confusion. 15
A likelihood of confusion may result from either forward
confusion or reverse confusion.16 Forward confusion, the more
traditional type, “occurs when a junior user of a mark uses it to sell
goods or services based on the misperception that they originate with
the mark’s senior user.” 17 Conversely, reverse confusion is
characterized by a junior user’s saturation of the market with a
trademark that is identical or similar to the senior user’s trademark. 18
Generally, with respect to reverse confusion, the junior user is larger
and more powerful than the senior user, 19 and “the junior user uses its
size and market penetration to overwhelm the senior, but smaller,
user.” 20 The senior user’s products are mistaken as originating from
the junior user. 21 Consequently, this confusion harms the senior user
by reducing the value of the trademark 22 as well as “its product
identity, corporate identity, control over its goodwill and reputation,
and ability to move into new markets.” 23 The doctrine of reverse
confusion “protects the senior user’s control of its mark and the
goodwill created by the mark from a junior user’s employment of the
mark, and protects the public from believing that the senior user’s
product” originates from the junior user. 24

15

Id.
Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a].
17
Id.
18
Id. § 2[a].
19
Id.
20
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir.
2007).
21
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 701 (7th
Cir. 2014).
22
Id.
23
Buckman, supra note 10, § 2[a].
24
Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d at 484.
16
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C. Reverse Confusion Doctrine
While the Seventh Circuit eventually recognized reverse
confusion in the 1992 case of Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker
Oats Co.25, it had previously declined to acknowledge the doctrine in
Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. 26 Westward, the small
senior user, registered and used the mark “Mustang” with the
representation of a running horse to market its campers and trailers,
which the large junior user Ford subsequently used to market its new
sports car. 27 Finding “no rational basis for support” of Westward’s
claim of reverse confusion,28 the Seventh Circuit analyzed the
infringement claim under the traditional likelihood of confusion
theory. The court held that because Westward’s sales were small and
the scope of its business narrow, its trademark was weak and did not
extend from campers to automobiles and its claim was not
actionable.29 If unaltered in subsequent cases, this decision “would
allow powerful junior users to undermine the trademark protection
accorded smaller businesses through sheer economic strength.”30 Not
only would such a rule disserve smaller businesses with senior rights
to a mark, but also the very consumers that trademark law seeks to
protect.
Federal courts first recognized the doctrine of reverse
confusion in the 1977 case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire

25

978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.1992) (holding for the first time that the trademark
holder could receive damages for reverse confusion, finding that the Lanham Act’s
objectives of protecting an owner’s interest in its trademark and preventing
consumer confusion are as important in a case of reverse confusion as in traditional
trademark infringement).
26
388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968).
27
Id. at 630.
28
Id. at 634.
29
Id. at 635.
30
Brent Folsom, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12
J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 258, 259 (2001).
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and Rubber Co. 31 In that case, junior user Goodyear saturated the
market with smaller senior user Big O’s trademark “Bigfoot” to
advertise its tires despite knowledge of the senior user’s ownership of
the mark.32 The Tenth Circuit held that under state law, Big O had an
actionable trademark infringement claim based on reverse confusion,33
reasoning that “[s]uch a rule would further Colorado’s policy of
protecting trade names and preventing public confusion.”34 Also
significant in Big O’s argument was the testimony of more than a
dozen witnesses who were actually confused about the source of Big
O’s tires after watching a Goodyear commercial.35 The Tenth Circuit’s
decision marked the first instance in which federal courts explicitly
upheld an infringement case based on reverse confusion.
D. Seventh Circuit’s Recognition of Reverse Confusion
The Seventh Circuit first recognized reverse confusion in Sands,
Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., in which the small soft
drink company and owner of the registered trademark “Thirst-Aid”
sued the larger junior user, Quaker, for using its mark in an advertising
slogan stating “Gatorade is Thirst Aid.”36 For the first time, the
Seventh Circuit held that the trademark holder could receive damages
for reverse confusion, finding that the Lanham Act’s objectives of
protecting an owner’s interest in its trademark and preventing
consumer confusion are as important in a case of reverse confusion as
in traditional trademark infringement.37

31

408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th
Cir. 1992).
37
Id. at 958.
32
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While many courts have since recognized trademark
infringement based on reverse confusion, there remains little case law
on the matter of a fictional good infringing upon the trademark of an
actual product. 38 Some courts have held that Lanham Act analysis in
reverse confusion cases should be modified “to reflect differences
regarding the strength of a mark in which user’s mark should be
analyzed.” 39 Courts have also held that Lanham Act analysis should
be modified “to reflect differences regarding the defendant’s intent
and bad faith.” 40
The Seventh Circuit has decided various reverse confusion
cases, including its 2014 decision in Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Entm’t Inc. In the Fortres Grand case, the Seventh Circuit
employed a seven-factor test in which it considered: (1) the degree of
similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the
similarity of the products for which the name is used; (3) the area and
manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised
by consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant’s mark; (6) actual
confusion; and (7) an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm
off his products as those of another.41
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE:
GOTHAM’S NEWEST VILLIAN, THE INFRINGER
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.
Fortres Grand holds a federally registered trademark for its
security software program, “Clean Slate,” which is “used to protect
public access computers by securing the computer drive back to its

38

6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:149
(4th ed. 2014).
39
Buckman, supra note 10, § 3[a].
40
Id.
41
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 702 (7th
Cir. 2014).
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original configuration upon reboot.” 42. The security software is used
to keep private data off of public computers. 43 As a security software,
“its single most important characteristic is trustworthiness,” which had
been established by Fortres Grand. 44 Fortres Grand obtained a federal
trademark registration for “Clean Slate” in 2001 for a “computer
software program used to protect public access computers by scouring
the computer drive back to its original configuration upon reboot.” 45
In 2012, Warner Bros. released the final installment of its
Batman films, The Dark Knight Rises.46 In the film, the character
Catwoman agrees to work with a “shadowy organization” in exchange
for a software program developed by “Rykin Data Corporation” called
“the clean slate,” which would allow Catwoman to remove her
criminal history from all databases, thus wiping “her slate clean.” 47
Upon completion of her work with the organization, Catwoman learns
from the organization that she was betrayed and “the clean slate” does
not exist. 48 The film later reveals that Batman’s alter ego, Bruce
Wayne, had secretly obtained “the clean slate” software, which he
offers to Catwoman in exchange for her help in saving Gotham City. 49
The film’s conclusion suggests that Catwoman successfully used the
software to wipe her slate clean of her criminal past, as she is living a
normal life with Bruce Wayne. 50 Not only was the fictional “clean
slate” software depicted in the film, but it was also used in
promotional websites featuring the fictional Rykin Data Corporation to
market the film. 51 While the websites did not feature “the clean slate”
42

Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
44
Id.
45
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.,947 F. Supp. 922, 924
(N.D. Ind.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
Fortres, 763 F.3d at 699.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 700.
43
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for purchase or download, the website did contain a description of the
software and an image of a fictional patent. 52
Fortres Grand experienced a decline in Clean Slate software
sales following the film’s release, and attributes this decline to
“potential customers mistakenly believing that its Clean Slate software
is illicit or phony on account of Warner Bros.’ use of the name ‘the
clean slate’” to describe a fictional software in the film. 53 Fortres
Grand filed a three-count suit against Warner Bros.’ alleging (1)
trademark infringement in violation of Lanham Act §§ 32, 43; 54 (2)
unfair competition under the Lanham Act; and (3) unfair competition
under Indiana trademark law. 55
B. Procedural History
Warner Bros. moved the district court to dismiss Fortres
Grand’s claims, challenging the sufficiency of complaint to state a
claim for trademark infringement 56 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 57 The
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend
Division, concluded that Fortres Grand had not sufficiently alleged
trademark infringement because its claim lacked a plausible theory of
consumer confusion. 58 The district court further held that Warner
Bros.’ use of the phrase “the clean slate” was protected by the free
speech guarantee of the First Amendment. 59
Chief Judge Simon of the district court noted that there is little
case law on whether a fictional company or product can infringe on a

52

Id.
Id.
54
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012).
55
Fortres, 763 F.3d at 700.
56
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 92526 (N.D. Ind. 2013).
57
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
58
Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
59
Id.
53
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trademark. 60 The court compared Fortres Grand’s Clean Slate
software and the Warner Bros.’ fictional “clean slate” software. 61
Over Fortres Grand’s objections, the court also considered the contents
of the fictional websites created to promote the film that mentioned the
fictional “clean slate” software and its fictional creator, Rykin Data
Corporation. 62 Although Fortres Grand argued that the contents of the
websites should be disregarded because they were only referenced in
the Complaint and not attached to it, the district court considered this
matter. The Seventh Circuit has held that it has “taken a broader view
of documents that may be considered on a motion to dismiss, nothing
that a court may consider, in addition to allegations set forth in the
Complaint itself, documents that are central to the complaint and are
referred to in it.” 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court evaluated Fortres Grand’s claims of
trademark infringement and state and federal unfair competition using
the same trademark infringement analysis because all three claims are
based upon the same law and facts. 64 The court noted that likelihood
of confusion is central to a trademark infringement action, and “only a
confusion about origin supports a trademark claim, and ‘origin’ for
this purpose means the ‘producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace.’” 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
further noted that trademark infringement does not protect against
confusion of origin generally, but rather only mistaken purchasing
decisions. 66 The court quickly ruled out the theory of forward
confusion; because senior user Fortres Grand is not as prominent as
junior user Warner Bros., Warner Bros. could not have attempted to
60

Id. at 924 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 38,§ 31:149).
Id.
62
Id. at 925.
63
Id. (citing Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013)).
64
Id. at 926.
65
Id. (quoting Eastland Music Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d
869, 872 (7th Cir. 2013)); See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).
66
Id. at 927; see also Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d
1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012).
61
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“capitalize on” Fortres Grand’s “good will and reputation by
suggesting that [its] product comes from the same source as does”
Fortres Grand’s “Clean Slate” software. 67
The district court then evaluated a theory of trademark
infringement by reverse confusion, in which the “large senior user
saturates the market with a trademark similar or identical to that of a
smaller, senior user, ”leading consumers to believe the two products
share the same origin 68 (internal quotes omitted). The court, in
evaluating the similarity of the two products, found a major flaw in
Fortres Grand’s argument that it has been “damaged by the reverse
confusion resulting from Warner Bros.’ saturation of the market with
its big-budget film and its promotional websites” 69 (internal quotes
omitted). The district court noted that because “the clean slate”
software from the film is a fictional software, the court must compare
the parties’ ultimate products,70 which in this instance are Fortres
Grand’s “Clean Slate” software to Warner Bros.’ film. 71
A theory of reverse confusion, the court noted, would certainly
have succeeded had Warner Bros. saturated the market with a
campaign for an actual software called the “Clean Slate.” 72 However,
in the present matter, the court compared Fortres Grand’s software to
Warner Bros.’ film and held that Fortres Grand failed to plausibly
allege: (1) consumer were deceived into believing the fictional
software from the film originates from or is connected to Fortres
Grand; or (2) consumers were deceived into believing that the film
originates from or is connected to Fortres Grand. 73 Holding that no
reasonable consumer would plausibly believe either of the
aforementioned notions, the court concluded that Fortres Grand failed
67

Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 926-27.
Id. at 927.
69
Id. at 928.
70
See Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp.
1546 (S.D.Fla.1990); Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901(8th Cir. 2005).
71
Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
72
Id. at 929.
73
Id. at 930.
68
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to state a claim for trademark infringement under both the traditional
“forward confusion” theory and the “reverse confusion” theory. 74 In
dictum, the court postulated that even if Fortres Grand had alleged a
plausible claim for likelihood of confusion, Warner Bros.’ use of
“clean slate” is protected by the First Amendment. 75
C. Reasoning
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “all three of Fortress
Grand’s claims depended on plausibly alleging that Warner Bros.’ use
of the words ‘clean slate’ is ‘likely to cause confusion’”76 under the
Lanham Act 77. The court stated that only confusion about “origin,
sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods supports a trademark claim”78
(internal quotes omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for infringement based on reverse confusion, Fortres
Grand must have alleged that “Warner Bros.’ use of the words ‘clean
slate’ in its movie to describe an elusive hacking program that can
eliminate information from any and every database on earth has
caused a likelihood that consumers will be confused into thinking that
Fortres Grand’s Clean Slate software ‘emanates from, is connected to,
or is sponsored by [Warner Bros.]’” 79
The Seventh Circuit employed a seven-factor test in evaluating
the plausibility of Fortres Grand’s allegation of confusion. 80 The court
considered: (1) the degree of similarity between the marks in
appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products for which
the name is used; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the
74

Id.
Id. at 931.
76
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th
Cir. 2014).
77
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005).
78
Fortres, 763 F.3d at 701.
79
Id. (quoting Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 484
(7th Cir. 2007)).
80
See generally Fortres, 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014).
75

241
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 1

Fall 2014

degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of
the complainant’s mark; (6) actual confusion; and (7) an intent on the
part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of
another. 81
Fortres Grand argued that in finding that Fortres Grand failed
to state a claim, the lower court improperly relied heavily on the
“similarity of he products” factor when it concluded that Fortres
Grand’s software and the Warner Bros.’ movie were not sufficiently
similar as to plausibly cause confusion. Fortres Grand argued that
instead of comparing its software to the movie, the court should have
compared its software to the fictional software in the movie. 82 The
issue, therefore, was whether the products are sufficiently similar as to
cause consumers to attribute them to a single source.
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on cases of forward
confusion that “have considered the likelihood of confusion between
the senior user’s product and the junior user’s creative work – not any
fictional product therein.” 83 In both Davis v. Walt Disney and Ocean
Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, those respective courts
compared the senior user’s product to the movie, not the fictional
product in the movie. 84 The Seventh Circuit held that this approach
aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on “the tangible product
sold in the marketplace.”85
Applying the product similarity rule to reverse confusion, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the proper tangible products to be
compared, the software and the film, were “quite dissimilar.” 86 The
81

McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (7th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 560
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977)).
82
See generally Fortres, 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2014)..
83
Id.
84
Id.; see also Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005);
Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1557
(S.D. FL 1990).
85
Fortres, 763 F.3d at 701 (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
Id. at 704.
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court further noted, “Fortres Grand has alleged no facts that would
make it plausible that a super-hero movie and desktop management
software are ‘goods related in the minds of consumers in the sense that
a single producer is likely to put out both goods.’” 87 The similarity of
the marks, the strongest factor in support of Fortres Grand’s argument,
is not enough considering the weakness of the other factors.88 The
court noted, “[t]rademark law protects the source-denoting function of
words used in conjunction with goods and services in the marketplace,
not the words themselves.”89 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s verdict in favor of Warner Bros., properly concluding that
Fortres Grand did not plausibly allege trademark infringement based
on reverse confusion.90 The Seventh Circuit did not, however, address
the matter of First Amendment protections as related to trademarks
because the insufficiency of the claim had already been determined.
ANALYSIS
A. Trademarks and First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides in relevant
part that “Congress shall make no law [. . .] abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.” 91 Because the Seventh Circuit found that
Fortres Grand’s Complaint did not sufficiently state a claim for reverse
confusion, the court did not address the matter of First Amendment
protections. 92 The lower court, however, held that Warner Bros.’ use
of the term “clean slate” was also protected by the First Amendment.93

87

Id.
Id. at 705
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92
Fortres,763 F.3d at 698.
93
Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 947 F.Supp.2d 922, 931
(N.D. Ind. 2013).
88
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In its holding, the lower court relied on the Second Circuit’s
balancing test for application of the Lanham Act, as established in
Rogers v. Grimaldi.94 The plaintiff in Rogers alleged that the
defendant’s film violated the Lanham Act’s rights of publicity and
privacy by creating the false impression that Ginger Rogers was
associated with the film “Ginger and Fred”.95 In Rogers, the Second
Circuit held that the Lanham Act must be narrowly construed, as
application of the Lanham Act to the titles of artistic works may
infringe First Amendment rights. 96 The Second Circuit reasoned that
that the Lanham Act applied “to artistic works only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest
in free expression.” 97 Because the film’s title had an ironic meaning
and did not directly state that it depicted Ginger Rogers, the interest in
free speech outweighed the potential misconception “that Rogers had
some involvement with the film.” 98 Applying the Second Circuit’s
test, the lower court in Fortres Grand reasoned that “the Lanham Act is
inapplicable to ‘artistic works’ as long as the defendant's use of the
mark is (1) ‘artistically relevant’ to the work and (2) not ‘explicitly
misleading’ as to the source or content of the work.99 Finding that the
Warner Bros.’ film constituted an artistic work, the lower court
correctly reasoned that Warner Bros. satisfied both prongs of the
Rogers test and was thus protected by the First Amendment. 100
While the Second Circuit discussed only the title of an artistic
work, the Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all expanded the

94

875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1989); see also Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d
1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2008).
95
Grimaldi,, 875 F.2d at 997.
96
Id. at 998.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1001.
99
Fortres Grand Corporation v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d
922, 931 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 997).
100
Id. at 932; see also Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d
Cir. 2008).
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Rogers test to apply to artistic works generally. 101 Applying the
Rogers test, the Second Circuit concluded that Warner Bros. use of the
term “clean slate” was artistically relevant and did not explicitly
mislead consumers as to the source of the work, satisfying both prongs
of the Rogers test. 102
The statutory canon of constitutional avoidance mandates that
courts construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional problems unless
such a construction is contrary to congressional intent. 103 Where
exactly, then, does the boundary between First Amendment rights and
trademark rights lie?
The Supreme Court first discussed the application of First
Amendment rights to commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestenson,
in which the Court held that “the Constitution imposes no restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising.” 104 More than
30 years later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court first held that the First Amendment
protects commercial speech. 105
Commercial speech is usually defined as “speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” 106 The sale of an
artistic work for profit does not make it per se commercial. 107
“Trademark rights promote the aims of the First Amendment by
enabling producers of the spoken and written word to differentiate

101

Fortres, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 931; see E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees
v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n.11 (6th Cir.2003); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1989).
102
Fortres, 947 F.Supp.2d at 932.
103
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
104
Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law,
61 SMU L. REV. 381, 390 (2008).
105
Id.
106
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107
Id. at 398.
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themselves.” 108 Although there is no conflict between free speech
principles and trademark law, 109 commercial speech enjoys less First
Amendment protection than non-commercial speech. 110 The Supreme
Court held in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson “that expression by means
of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press
guaranty” even though film-making “is a large-scale business
conducted for private profit.” 111 The Court “implicitly characterized
motion pictures as noncommercial speech when it held this expression
is protected by the First Amendment.” 112 Therefore, “use of another’s
mark within the context of artistic of literary expression should
generally be classified as noncommercial speech that is fully protected
by the First Amendment.” 113 If the use of a trademark is misleading, it
is excluded from First Amendment protections. 114 As in the Fortres
Grand case, when an artistic expression is deemed noncommercial, it
receives the full protection of the First Amendment. The courts must
protect the fundamental right of free expression, especially when that
expression is noncommercial and thus does not conflict with the
commercial objectives that trademark law seeks to protect.
B. Impact on Future Reverse Confusion Cases
The Seventh Circuit has decided only a handful of cases in
which plaintiffs’ claims were based on a theory of reverse confusion,
holding in most that there was no likelihood of confusion as to violate
the Lanham Act. Although there are few cases discussing whether a
fictional good may plausibly infringe upon the trademark of an actual
product, it is likely that such cases will be heard by courts more

108

MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 31:139.
Id.
110
Ramsey, supra note 104, at 396.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 412.
109
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extensively as the worlds of actual goods, entertainment, and social
media intermingle.
While businesses hold an important interest in protecting their
trademarks and the goodwill that may accompany it, the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression remains a central
tenet of American culture for both individuals and businesses. The
District Court of Northern Indiana properly decided in the Fortres
Grand case that even if Warner Bros.’ use of the term “clean slate” in
The Dark Knight Rises resulted in a likelihood of confusion among
consumers as to the source of either parties’ products, Warner Bros. is
protected by the First Amendment. When it comes to artistic
expression, artists, like filmmakers, should be able to express an idea
without fear of infringing upon the trademark of another. In the United
Stated, there are two million registered trademarks and countless
unregistered trademarks. It would be unduly burdensome for a
filmmaker, for instance, to research every term or phrase it uses to
ensure it has not violated the trademark of another. This burden is fair
when a business is creating a product for use in commerce, because
the research is limited, but excessively onerous for a filmmaker or
other artist creating a more extensive work.
Although the First Amendment protects artistic works from
trademark infringement lawsuits, businesses must still protect their
trademarks, along with their goodwill and reputation among
consumers, with claims based on the Lanham Act. The reverse
confusion doctrine is very much applicable when two goods or
services in commerce using identical marks create a likelihood of
confusion. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in the Fortres Grand
provides an additional decision in the area of potential trademark
infringement in entertainment, upholding and applying the doctrine of
reverse confusion that has established its rank as a plausible theory for
trademark infringement.
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